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East Asia is an important region for global stability. Major economies—China, 
Japan, and South Korea—are located in the region. The phenomenon of a rising China, 
the response of the United States to a rising China, and the interaction of these two major 
powers in the area, as well as the relations among the principal actors of the region—the 
United States, China, Japan, and South Korea—will determine the stability of the region. 
Realists maintain a pessimistic view regarding a rising China and East Asia; liberals are 
optimistic and contend that because of the greater economic interdependency of nations 
in the region, the prospect of a conflict is not likely. However, the long-standing distrust, 
resentment, and territorial disputes among these nations are drivers of bilateral relations 
of China, South Korea, and Japan, and these problems may undermine the long-term 
stability of the region. Turkey is also a growing economy, and stability in East Asia is 
important for Turkey. Turkey historically has had good relations with China, South 
Korea, and Japan. Turkey, as a responsible member of the international community, 
could play a more active role and could contribute to the stability of the region by 
actively engaging with the three principal actors of East Asia to resolve their problems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
East Asia’s economic and political importance is growing. Major economies—
China, Japan, and South Korea—are located in the region. The phenomenon of a rising 
China, the response of the United States to a rising China, and the interaction of these two 
major powers in the area, as well as the relations among the principal actors of the 
region—the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea—will determine the stability 
of the region. In this era of global economic interdependence, the stability of East Asia is 
important for the rest of the world, because the level of economic interaction between the 
region and the world is high. Other countries could contribute to the peace and stability of 
the region by actively engaging the key countries of the area. 
Historical events have shaped contemporary relations in East Asia. The region 
faced dramatic changes during the 19th and 20th centuries. China realized the great 
kingdom’s backwardness in comparison with the West.1 Starting from the Opium War in 
1839, China lost its sovereign position to the tribute states of Asia. Japan rose to the 
position of super power of the region after realizing the importance of modernization and 
industrialization, and later Japan started to conquer and colonize its neighbors. A series of 
such incidents occurred during World War I, the Inter-war period, World War II, and the 
Korean War, and created contentious issues and disputed territories among the three 
leading countries of East Asia. Today, China, South Korea, and Japan still have 
unresolved, contentious issues and territorial disputes among them.  
Moreover, the rise of China exacerbates the situation in East Asia. A militarily 
and economically powerful China arouses suspicions among its neighbors, and the 
response of the United States is another important issue for the stability of the region. 
Two schools of thought suggest two outcomes for a rising China. Realists believe the 
current situation will eventually lead to a conflict between the United States and China 
                                                 
1 Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2008), 128–29.  
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because China will challenge the United States in the region if she keeps up her economic 
and military growth. China will try to expel the United States from the region, and then 
conflict is inevitable. Liberals think that the economic interdependence of China and the 
international community will inhibit China’s assertiveness as she is rising. Liberals 
believe the rise of China will not be a challenge for the current order and will not lead to 
war among the powers.  
The problems among China, Japan, and South Korea are still a source of debate 
and national resentment among these countries’ citizens. These problems are the main 
obstacles to the long-term stability of East Asia. A third-party country’s active 
engagement with China, Japan, and South Korea would be beneficial for creating another 
bond among these countries for the long-term stability of the region. In this regard, a 
third-party country that has good relations with these countries and has no direct interests 
in the region could play a significant role in opening venues for China, Japan, and South 
Korea.  
Turkey has had historically good relations and is ethnically related to the area. 
The ancestors of Turkey’s Turks emigrated from Asia, from a region near today’s China. 
Turkey has good relations with these three countries, and has no strategic interest in the 
East Asia. Further, relations between Turkey and Japan date back to the era of the 
Ottoman Empire and have always been on positive terms. Turkey’s relationship with 
South Korea is not as old, but it is also positive. This tie began with the role of the 
Turkish Army role in the Korean War. The historical and ethnic linkage of Turkey to the 
region forces Turkey to be proactive in East Asia.  
In this research I will analyze how the International Relations theories view the 
rise of China in East Asia and how the current problems among the key countries of 
region—China, South Korea, and Japan—affect the future of the East Asia. Despite the 
realists’ pessimistic view regarding a rising China, liberals are optimistic and contend 
that because of greater economic interdependency among these nations, the prospect of a 
conflict is not likely. However, the long-standing distrust, resentment, and territorial 
disputes are drivers of bilateral relations of China, South Korea, and Japan, and these 
problems may undermine the long-term stability of the region. Turkey is a growing 
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economy, and stability in East Asia is important for Turkey. Turkey, as responsible 
member of the international community, could play a more active role and could 
contribute to the stability of the region by actively engaging with the three principal 
actors of East Asia to resolve their problems.  
Unsolved problems could trigger a conflict in the region. As M. Taylor Fravel 
contends, a possible conflict in the area could be over territorial control.2 Any attempt to 
diminish a possible conflict in the region is crucial. An analysis of Turkey’s military 
efforts creates an opportunity to explore solutions to the problems that could trigger a 
conflict threatening the stability of the region. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The rising economic and political powers of East Asia take the attention of the 
whole world. The key players in the region are China, Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States. “China is a rising power that is simultaneously transforming its domestic 
politics and economics, extending its regional influence, and demanding the respect and 
recognition of other major powers.”3 China, Japan, and South Korea have historical 
challenges in their relations that are major barriers to long-term stability in the region. 
The interaction among the major powers of the region—the United States and China—
will determine the future of the region, which affects other parts of the world in the era of 
high interdependency. In this regard, the stability of East Asia is important and will be 
more important in the future for other countries.  
The historical and territorial problems and challenges among the key countries of 
the region and a militarily and economically powerful China are reasons for the lack of 
stability in East Asia. Notably, China’s military spending became second to the United 
States in 2014 when total expenditures reached USD 216 billion.4 China’s efforts to 
                                                 
2 M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for 
Territorial Expansions,” International Studies Review 12 (2010): 506. 
3 G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, “International Relations Theory and the Search for 
Regional Stability, in International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific, ed. John Ikenberry and Michael 
Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 2.  
4 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014,” SIPRI, , accessed March 3, 2016, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database. 
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strengthen its military concern Japan and South Korea, which have historically opposing 
stances to China and each other and still have unresolved territorial disputes.5  
The problems among China, South Korea, and Japan, especially territorial 
disputes could trigger a military conflict.6 Given the complicated situation, solving the 
problems among these countries is essential for the stability of the region. Understanding 
the prospect and effects of a rising China is crucial to exert policies within the area. There 
are two prevailing schools of thought regarding the rise of China and the implications of 
China’s ascendance in East Asia. Realists view the rise of China as a reason for conflict 
and power struggle in the region; a rising power inevitably leads to an environment of 
conflict, because the other states would be insecure and would perceive the rising power 
as a threat. On the other hand, liberals view the rise of China as potentially peaceful; 
liberals are optimistic about the ascendance of China and the future of Asia because of 
China’s interdependence with the global economic order. 
Realism mainly “believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point 
of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature.”7 There is no government 
among states, and the international system is “anarchic.”8 As John J. Mearsheimer warns, 
“There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in the system that states can turn to if they get 
into trouble and need help.”9 The international order is a “self-help system,” and states 
are sovereign “units [that] worry about their survival.”10 The anarchy in international 
order forces the states to ensure their own security, and the threats are too many in the 
“anarchic order.”11 Cooperation is limited in the international structure because of the 
                                                 
5 Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Maritime Disputes,” http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/
chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345. 
6 Fravel, “China’s Potential for Territorial Expansions,” 506. 
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Albert A. Michelson, and Leonard Davis, Politics among Nations: The Struggle 
for Power and Peace, 5th Ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1973), 3. 
8 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 102. 
9 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2014), 363. 
10 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105. 
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 18, no. 4 (1988): 619, doi:10.2307/204817. 
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unequal “division of gains” and fear of dependency on another state.12 Thus, conflict is 
inevitable because, according to Kenneth Neal Waltz, “a state that is amassing 
instruments of war, even for its own defensive, is cast by others as a threat requiring a 
response.”13 States in the international order “struggle for power”; “freedom, security, 
prosperity, or power itself” is the ultimate goal.14 The struggle over power generates 
conflicts among nations and creates an anarchic world order. Mearsheimer, who 
represents the offensive realist stance, and A. F. K. Organski, who represents the power 
transition view, give great importance to the rising China phenomenon in realist theory.  
Mearsheimer envisions a bleak future. He contends that China will inevitably 
threaten the United States, based on the offensive realism theory. “The ultimate goal of 
every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the 
system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish 
hegemony in their region of the world while also ensuring that no rival great power 
dominates another area.”15 States only feel secure when they are more powerful relative 
to their competitors.16 States would accumulate power to guarantee their security until 
they are dominant in their region. In this regard, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 
assert, “China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth 
over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense 
security competition with considerable potential for war.”17 The enormous amount of the 
U.S. military spending in the world, the power projection of the United States into Asia, 
and aircraft carriers located in Taiwan could be seen as offensive actions by China.18 
Mearsheimer thinks that “[a]n increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the 
United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great 
                                                 
12 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 106. 
13 Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” 619. 
14 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 27. 
15 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 363. 
16 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 364. 
17 Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy 146, no. 1 
(2005): 47. 
18 Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” 385–6.  
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powers out of the Western Hemisphere.”19 Economic development will lead China to 
dominate Asia for its survival in the anarchic world order. 
Organski’s power transition theory suggests that the conflict is inevitable between 
the dominant power and the rising power, when the gap of power narrows. Power 
asymmetry is the sole reason for the peace. He thinks “that world peace is guaranteed 
when the nations satisfied with the existing international order enjoy an unchallenged 
supremacy of power and that major wars are most likely when a dissatisfied challenger 
achieves an approximate balance of power with the dominant nation.”20 Rising states, 
due to their dissatisfaction with the current international order, make war to change the 
situation according to their interests.21 The process of power transition ends with a 
conflict in the international system.22 Back in the 1960s, Organski contemplated that 
China would become “the most powerful nation on earth.”23 The rising China eventually 
will become a challenge to international order as she narrows the power gap between the 
United States. 
Fravel has developed a counter argument against these two alarming thoughts. 
According to Fravel, these ideas have two limitations. The lack of analysis of the scope 
and the sources for the unrealized benefits that could force China to be aggressive and the 
lack of systematical evaluation of costs and advantages of the conflict are main critiques 
raised by Fravel.24 The benefits of being an aggressive China in the region are not clear. 
Another school of thought regarding a rising China is liberalism. Liberals are 
optimistic about the international system. They focus on the positive side of human 
nature and think man is mainly good; the likelihood of conflict could be diminished 
                                                 
19 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History (April 2006): 162. 
20 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), 333. 
21 Organski, World Politics, 338. 
22 Organski, World Politics, 323. 
23 Organski, World Politics, 446. 
24 Fravel, “China’s Potential for Territorial Expansions,” 506. 
 7
through cooperation.25 Sovereign states are not the only central actors in world politics; 
according to Ole R. Holsti, individuals, interest groups, and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations all have an influence on states.26 Liberals believe that 
conflict could be avoided, although they share the realists’ assumption that there is 
anarchy in the international system.27 Liberalism accepts that states are more prone to 
cooperate, while realism gives no credit to cooperation. 
Liberals believe cooperation and economic interdependence could mitigate 
conflicts among the states. Cooperation is most likely when there is a minimum level of 
gain; as Barry Hughes observes, “a state will often cooperate if it can obtain absolute gain 
from doing so, even if other states might gain more.”28 Besides cooperation, liberals such 
as Amitav Acharya contend that strong economic and institutional interactions among 
states and other international actors will decrease the likelihood of conflicts.29 The 
liberal’s main argument is “that interdependence decreases the incentives for conflict and 
war, in part because states become reluctant to disrupt or jeopardize the welfare benefits 
of open economic exchange, and in part because domestic interest groups with stake in 
interdependence constrain the ability of the state to act autonomously.”30 Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye define interdependence as “situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.”31 The “costly 
effect” of “[i]nternational transactions—flows of money, goods, people, and messages 
across international boundaries” creates a “complex interdependence” among 
                                                 
25 Barry Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 55–64. 
26 Ole R. Holsti, “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 13, no. 1 
(1989): 23–26. 
27 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International 
Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 7–9. 
28 Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics, 56. 
29 Amitav Acharya, “Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR “ in International Relations of Asia, ed. 
David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 69–72. 
30 Ikenberry, “International Relations Theory and the Search for Regional Stability,” 17. 
31 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 8. 
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international actors that prevents a likelihood of conflict.32 Given this liberal perspective, 
George Glasier suggests that “the current international order is defined by economic and 
political openness, it can accommodate China’s rise peacefully.”33 China’s economic 
development has been achieved through high interconnectedness with the global 
economic system. 
China has been interconnected to the East Asian and global economic systems, 
and “economic interdependence within the region has been robust and growing.”34 
China, according to the liberal perspective, has become an engine of growth and a 
catalyst for regional integration. China’s interconnectedness to the world would inhibit it 
from taking military action. More likely, China would try to solve its problems with other 
regional countries in a more peaceful way. 
Realism has a pessimistic view on the future of the region, while liberalism 
suggests a more cooperative and peaceful East Asia. In reality, actions shape the future. 
The problems among the three main countries of East Asia are sources of instability for 
the region, and a problem could trigger a conflict in the region.35 Creating opportunities 
for these countries to provide chances for solving their problems is of utmost importance 
for the stability of the region. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The problems among these three countries are deep rooted and have an impact on 
each of their societies. The colonization of East Asia by Japan’s Imperial Army, the wars 
cited earlier, the unfair treaties, and the history of war crimes have caused problems and 
the situation of disputed territories among these countries. Worse, the politicians and 
policy makers sometimes have used these problems to Influence their own citizens. These 
three countries are so entangled in these problems that a third party’s hand is needed to 
facilitate an end to these disputes. In this regard my first hypothesis is that the United 
                                                 
32 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 8–9. 
33 Charles Glasier, “Will China’s Rise lead to War?,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2011): 81. 
34 Ikenberry, “International Relations Theory and the Search for Regional Stability,” 16. 
35 Fravel, “China’s Potential for Territorial Expansions,” 506. 
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States as a third party trying to facilitate a solution to the problems of these countries 
would be perceived as threatening and suspicious by China and could be futile. 
China is economically developing and commensurately increasing its military 
spending. This economic and military expansion by China has created the rising China 
phenomenon that caused the containment and alignment efforts in the region. On the 
other hand, South Korea and Japan are strong allies of the United States in the region. 
The United States’ efforts to end the problems of these countries would be seen as 
suspicious, especially by China, and would be futile. In this sense my second hypothesis 
is that Turkey, which has a good relationship with each country and has no strategic 
interest in the region, would be more beneficial as a third-party facilitator among these 
countries. 
The Turkish Army is the second largest army in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and a strong ally of the West. The Turkish Army has the capability 
of creating opportunities for these countries to solve their problems. My last hypothesis 
addresses by which diplomatic means the Turkish military could create a venue for 
solving the problems among these countries. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The problems among China, Japan, and South Korea started at the end of the 19th 
century and deepened throughout the next century. On the other hand, Turkey has its 
origins in the neighboring Central Asia region and has historical relations with these 
countries. My methodology for assessing Turkey’s suitability as a facilitator in their 
problem resolution process is a historical approach for this study. The historical approach 
is the appropriate approach for understanding the sources of the problems among these 
three countries and Turkey’s relations with these countries. Moreover, this approach 
provides information for understanding the military diplomacy capability of the Turkish 
Army. 
I use a combination of both primary and secondary sources to explain the 
problems among these three countries, the phenomenon of a rising China, and Turkey’s 
relations with these countries. 
 10
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II. TURKEY AND EAST ASIA 
A. TURKEY’S BONDS TO ASIA  
Turkey thinks of herself as an Asian country and has emphasized on many 
occasions her historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with the region.36 Despite 
the long distance between Turkey and Asia, Turkey has close ties with the region. The 
ancestors of Turkey’s Turks emigrated 13 centuries ago from Central Asia and the region 
near today’s China. Turkey remained unaware of her Asian connection during the 
Ottoman Empire era. Turkey established her first diplomatic relations with China, Japan, 
and South Korea during the Turkish Republic era. Historical events are the primary 
source of good relations between Turkey and the region. 
More recently, economic relations increased between Turkey and the region after 
the 1980s during Turkey’s search to grow economically. Turkey started to establish 
economic links with economic success stories with the region—particularly with Japan, 
South Korea, and China. Later the historically good relations and increased economic 
relations helped to start some military and defense relations with these countries. 
Maritime security cooperation with Japan, defense industry projects with South Korea, 
and failed defense procurement due to the challenge of compatibility with China are 
military interaction efforts of Turkey with these countries. Turkey has historical bonds to 
East Asia and has an increasing ratio of cooperation in diverse areas with China, Japan, 
and South Korea. 
B. TURKEY AND CHINA 
Turkey has a long relationship with China that dates back to prehistoric times. 
The ancestors of the modern day Turks originally came from Central Asia, and from the 
area close to present-day China.37 China still has seven Turkic language-speaking ethnic 
                                                 
36 “Turkey’s Relations With Asia-Pacific,” Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, accessed October 20, 2016, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa. 
37 Yilmaz Oztuna, Turk Tarihinden Yapraklar [Leaves from Turkish History] (Istanbul: Otuken, 
2016), 13. 
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minorities who live in the country.38 Despite historical closeness, Turks in Turkey did 
not become interested in their ancestors’ homeland until World War I, the last days of 
Ottoman Empire.  
Turkey did not establish a solid relationship with the China other than sending 
delegates on some minor symbolic visits during the Ottoman Empire. There are historical 
records that Ottoman official envoys traveled to China in the time of Ming Dynasty.39 
Turkey later had no tangible ties with China until the Turkish Republic era. Turkey and 
China started their fuller relations at the beginning of the 20th century; “a treaty of 
friendship and commerce was signed in 1934.”40 Later, World War II and Chinese Civil 
War decreased the interaction of two countries, and relations became dormant. 
The new international order established after World War II and the Cold War 
shaped the next phase of relations between Turkey and China in the second half of the 
20th century. Turkey aligned with the Western world after World War II. The victory of 
the communists in the Chinese Civil War shifted the aspect of Turkey’s relations toward 
China. Turkey, as a member of the anti-communist group and an ally of the United 
States, aligned her China policy according to her relationship with the United States and 
the Western world. Turkey started her relations with Taiwan as the legitimate 
government of all China; Turkey moved the Turkish embassy to Taiwan and stopped her 
relations with mainland China.41 
                                                 
38 Wolfram Eberhard, Çin: Sinoloji’ye Giriş [China: Introduction to Sinology] (Istanbul: Pulhan 
Matbaası, 1946), 8. 
39 Giray Fidan, “Sino-Turkish Relations: An Overview,” Middle East Institute, October 4, 2013, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/sino-turkish-relations-overview#_ftn3. 
40 Selda Altan, “Osmanlı’ya Doğudan Bakmak: 20. Yüzyıl Dönümünde Çin’de Osmanlı Algısı ve 
Milliyetçilik[Viewving Ottoman from East: The Perception of Ottoman and Nationalism in China in the 
Wake of 20th Century],” in Türkiye’de Çin’i Düşünmek: Ekonomik, Siyasi ve Kültürel İlişkilere Yeni 
Yaklaşımlar [Thinking on China in Turkey: New Approaches in Economic, Political, and Cultural 
Relations], ed. Selçuk Esenbel, İsenbike Togan and Altay Atlı (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 
2013), 95. 
41 Altay Atlı, Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards China, Analysis and Recommendations for 
Improvement (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University, 2016), 6. 
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Another confrontation was the Korean War; Turkey sided with the Allies and 
fought against Chinese-backed North Korea.42 Relations remained frozen until the 1970s. 
Turkey recognized the government of mainland China in 1971, as the United States 
established her relations with China.43 Nevertheless, Turkey did not take her level of 
relations with China further at the time due to domestic problems.  
In the 1980s, relations between the two countries started again, but this time the 
interaction was at a high level. After the death of Mao, the economic developments of 
Deng Xiaoping’s China prompted Turkey to engage with China regarding trade and 
investment. “President Kenan Evren to China in 1982, followed by Chinese President Li 
Xiannian’s visit to Turkey in 1984, Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s visit to China in 1985, 
and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Turkey in 1986 contributed not only to take 
the first concrete steps toward a stronger relationship but also to a greater understanding 
and awareness between the two peoples.”44 Despite these high-level visits, it was the end 
of the Cold War that changed the level of relations between the two countries 
dramatically.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought new 
opportunities. The economic development of China and high growth rate made China a 
major trade partner of Turkey.45 In addition to economic relations, China started to offer 
economically feasible options for the defense industry.46 Yet, cooperation in the defense 
industry comprised challenges in compatibility of the defense systems of the two 
countries, so the cooperation efforts did not end positively. 
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Economic relations between Turkey and China improved as China’s economic 
growth and economic interaction with the global community ensued. China became an 
important commercial partner for Turkey.47  
Turkey’s efforts in relations with China were based on economic issues; Turkey 
would like to benefit from the second largest economy in the world. In other areas, the 
relations were also on good terms. From China’s perspective, “Turkey offers a number of 
advantages to the Chinese in terms of its access to the EU [European Union], the Middle 
East and North Africa, and the Caucasus and Balkans.”48 Turkey as a historically linked 
country to Asia has good relations with China, and both countries derive mutual benefit 
of this relationship.  
C. TURKEY AND JAPAN 
The Japanese people perceive Turkey “as one of the most pro-Japanese nations in 
the world,” which strengthens the “psychological attachment” of the two countries.49 The 
historical events and good nature of the relationship between these two countries has 
helped to create this perception. Both countries have good relations starting from their 
first interaction.  
The Turkish-Japanese relations date back to the late years of the Ottoman Empire. 
The good relationship between two countries started after the tragic accident of Ertugrul 
Frigate in 1890.50 The “hospitality and assistance” of the Japanese people to the 
survivors of the frigate initiated the relations.51 The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire in 
search of new political power decided to send a missionary to Asia to engage the 
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Muslims under the colony of Britain, which at that time was the primary challenge to the 
Empire together with Russia.52 “Intended to augment Ottoman prestige in Muslim Asia 
and establish relations with distant Japan, the Ertugrul frigate was commissioned as a 
training ship to visit ports with Muslim populations and Japan as its final destination.”53 
The frigate sank while returning home; the Japanese government rescued and took the 
survivors back to Turkey with Japanese ships.54 The valiant behavior of the Japanese 
government and people left a “memory of gratitude” in the Turkish people, and the 
Ertugrul Frigate became a “solemn symbol of friendship” between Turkey and Japan.55 
Based on a sentimental issue, the relations between the two nations started well.  
After the founding of the new Turkish Republic, the good relations were pursued 
by both countries. The Turkish Republic started her first diplomatic relations in East Asia 
with Japan.56 Later, except during World War II, relations between the two countries 
remained on good terms. In the 1980s during the administration of Turgut Ozal, Turkey 
started a multidimensional policy in search of diversifying the channels to integrate 
Turkey to the rest of the world economically and politically when Japan was rising 
economically.57 As a result of this active policy of Turgut Ozal, Japanese companies 
began to invest in Turkey. Toyota’s accumulated exports, for example, have totaled USD 
21.4 billion since 2002.58 The economic side of the relationship became more important. 
In recent years Japanese investment in Turkey has been significant; Japanese enterprises 
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have considerable involvement in major projects of Turkey.59 The economic side of the 
relations remains the dominant part of the interaction between two countries.  
Another symbolic incident of the good friendship between these two countries is 
the rescue of Japanese citizens from Iran by the Turkish Government during the 
beginning of Iran-Iraq War.60 In 1985, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein announced that 
civilian planes would also be hit if they passed through Tehran. After this announcement 
of the Iraq government, many countries began to rescue their citizens. Although 250 
Japanese citizens were able to leave Iran by using the planes of various European 
airlines,61 the hopes of the rest of the Japanese citizens stranded there were decreasing. 
Japanese citizens were finally rescued from Tehran by the planes of Turkish Airlines sent 
by Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal.62 This rescue operation deepened the friendship 
between the Turkish and Japanese people; Japanese people perceived that Turkey has 
sympathy for Japan, and Turkish people see the Japanese as their close friends. 
Turkey and Japan have good relations, and both societies perceive each other very 
positively. Japanese politicians see Turkey as a treasure house of knowledge for the 
Middle East for expanding the scope of Japanese foreign policy.63 Japan regards Turkey 
as an important nation, because of her contribution to “regional stability” and her location 
at “the crossroads of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.”64 Turkey and Japan will likely 
keep their good relations and enhance this relationship in further areas of cooperation. 
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D. TURKEY AND SOUTH KOREA 
Turkey and South Korea’s political relations were established on August 11, 
1949.65 Turkey’s participation in the Korean War on the side of the South Korea marked 
the start of friendly relations between the two countries. Turkey sent 4,500 soldiers, 
which was the second largest troop contribution, to Korea as a sign of willingness to 
participate in peacekeeping efforts and aligning with the West.66 Turkey’s participation 
in the Korean War helped Turkey to join NATO.67 Moreover, Turkey gained the respect 
and love of the South Korean people; the participation of Turkey in the Korean War 
started a firm, friendly relationship between the two countries. 
The Turkish contribution to the Korean War was significant in proportion to her 
capabilities. Turkey sent 14,976 troops to Korea as the fourth largest number of military 
personnel between 1950 and 1953.68 The casualty rate of Turkey was around 3,277, 
ıncludıng 721 soldiers killed in action.69 Turkey ranked second to the Unıted States ın 
number of casualtıes.70Turkey and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1957, 
after the Korean War. Turkey’s support for South Korea during the war and the 
interaction of the troops with the society helped for stable, friendly relations. 
Turkish soldiers stayed in Korea after the war. Turkey sent a brigade each year 
until 1966, and later a company was stationed in Korea as honor guards until 1971.71 
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Turkish troops interacted with the Korean people; the relations between two societies 
became more intense. The existence of Turkish forces in Korea helped the two cultures to 
have friendly relations with each other. The Korean War helped the relations between 
Turkey and South Korea in a better way, and it was a turning point for both countries to 
have good relations. 
The Korean War started the relationship between the two countries on a military 
basis; however, later the relationship became more economically centered. Especially 
after the economic growth of South Korea, Turkey-South Korea economic relations 
became more robust. As a consequence of good relations, South Korea’s major 
enterprises entered Turkey, and investment from South Korea reached the amount of 
USD 372 million between 2004 and 2014.72 The economic relationship eventually led to 
cooperation in the defense industry.  
Turkey and South Korea have remained on good relations since the Korean War. 
The relationship between the two countries has been enhanced in a broader spectrum of 
economy, defense industry, military intelligence, and culture. Turkey and South Korea 
could cooperate in many opportunities to promote stability in the East Asian region. 
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III. TURKEY’S INTEREST IN EAST ASIA 
The rising economic and political powers of East Asia take the attention of the 
whole world. Sixty percent of the world’s population is living in this region.73 In this 
regard, any incident and development in the region will have global effects.74 The 
stability of East Asia is crucial for the rest of the world. 
Turkey is a developing economy. Turkey’s emerging economy enhances Turkey’s 
influence regionally and globally. Turkey “as the 18th largest economy in the world and 
7th largest economy in Europe with a GDP of about 800 billion dollars” is a member of 
the G20.75 East Asia’s volatile economy and increasing political importance provide “an 
attractive opportunity” for Turkey’s economy and global political influence.76  
Two essential aspects shape Turkey’s interest and relations in regards to Asia. 
First, the economic significance of the region forces Turkey to give importance to East 
Asia in her economic policies. Second, the Central Asian and Xingjian issues are primary 
aspects of Turkish foreign policy; Turkey has historical, ethnic, and emotional bonds with 
both regions’ people. China’s increasing economic dominance and political influence in 
Central Asia, and the situation of Xingjian Uyghurs in China force Turkey to be proactive 
in the region, especially in her relations with China. 
Asia’s increasing role in the global economy and huge population are the aspects 
that attract the rest of the word. Demographically, with 4.3 billion people Asia comprises 
60 percent of the world’s population, and “[e]ight of the world’s fifteen most populated 
nations are in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Japan, the Philippines, 
                                                 
73 David Shambaugh, “International Relations in Asia,” in International Relations of Asia, ed. David 
Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 6. 
74 “Turkey’s Relations with Asia-Pacific” Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, accessed September 20, 
2016, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa. 
75 “Economic Outlook of Turkey” Turkish Foreign Ministry Affairs, accessed September 20, 2016, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/prospects-and-recent-developments-in-the-turkish-economy.en.mfa. 
76 Selcuk Colakoglu, “Turkey’s Evolving Strategic Balance with China, Japan and South Korea” East-
West Center Asia Pacific Bulletin 235 (October 8, 2013), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/
apb235.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=34279.  
 20
and Vietnam).”77 The importance and economic volatility provide an opportunity for 
Turkey to nurture her own economic and global influence.  
The end of the Cold War opened a new dimension in Turkish foreign policy; Asia 
became one of the mainstream foreign policy issues of Turkey. The independence of the 
Central Asian countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union opened new opportunities 
for Turkey.78  
Central Asia is imperative for Turkish foreign policy; however, the deficiency in 
projecting economic and political power has kept Turkey’s relations with countries in this 
region mainly on the cultural and education levels. The International Organization of 
Turkic Culture (TURKSOY),79 The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking 
Countries (TURKPA)80 were the agencies established to enhance the cooperation among 
Central Asian countries and Turkey. Despite being the one major economic party within 
the region, Turkey lags behind Russia and China. China has risen as a major economic 
player in the region, mainly as an energy buyer.81 China is particularly interested in 
energy resources of the region. However, China tries to use the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) to expand her influence in the region.82 By contrast, the United 
States has had little involvement in this region. “U.S. policymakers generally viewed the 
region as a relatively low priority, and American engagement to achieve greater stability, 
security, and prosperity as well as better governance remained limited.”83 Turkey has 
been using soft power instruments like education and cultural cooperation agencies in her 
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Central Asian policies; these soft power tools could be valuable in exerting policies to 
shape China’s rising influence. Turkey’s close engagement with China could help pursue 
better policies in Central Asia. 
Xinjiang is a sensitive issue in relations between China and Turkey. Turkey has 
close cultural, religious, and ethnic links with the Uyghurs, who live in China’s Xinjiang 
region.84 China views the Uyghurs as a separatist domestic problem.85 Turkey insists on 
for the “political and cultural rights of Uyghurs” to China.86 The Uyghurs remain as a 
potential problem maker between Turkey and China.  
Turkey is relatively dormant for the disputes in Asia that affect the foreign 
policies of all the regional countries.87 Although Turkey has taken no sides in disputes of 
the region, the problems among China, South Korea, and Japan acting as a trigger for 
major problems is a concern for the stability of East Asia. 
Turkey, as a developing country has an interest in engaging with Asia—especially 
with China—because the economic importance of region gives an opportunity to enhance 
her influence globally. Another significant advantage of Turkey’s close engagement with 
China serves the interest of Turkey in Central Asia and Xinjiang problem. First, Turkey’s 
involvement in the region could help to exert better policies especially when Central Asia 
faces China’s increasing economic dominance and political influence in Central Asia. 
Turkey’s closeness to China can give her an upper hand in handling Xingjian Turks’ 
problems. 
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IV. CHINA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS AND 
CHALLENGES  
The history of East Asia bears the key aspects of current relations among China, 
South Korea, and Japan. The defeat of China in the Opium War was a sign of 
backwardness of the Asian countries in comparison to the industrialized West.88 The lost 
wars and invasions kicked off by the Opium War made China a “semi-colonial” 
country.89 The unequal treaties that were forced upon the Asian countries fueled the 
Japanese to find ways to modernize and catch up with the Western countries; Japan 
started a modernization program in 1868 and became the first industrialized Asian 
country.90 Japan followed the path of developed Western powers. Japan after 
industrialization turned her massive Imperial Army to the other Asian countries for their 
resources.91 Military elites ruled Japan during World War II, and the Japanese Army 
caused too many traumas in China and Korea that remain as contentious issues between 
these countries.  
The current bilateral relations of China, Japan, and South Korea are forged by 
Japan’s pre-World War II colonization of Korea and China and by war crimes of 
Japanese Army. The distrust and resentment among these societies and long-standing 
territorial disputes are drivers of their bilateral relations. 
A. THE CHINA–JAPAN RELATIONSHIP 
The realization of China’s defeat after the Opium Wars, Japanese colonization of 
Chinese territory, and the war against the Japanese Army shaped the current China–Japan 
relationship. In 1895 the Sino-Japanese War over Korea marked the emergence of Japan 
as a world power and showed the weakness of the Chinese empire; China was no longer 
the leading hegemon in the Asia and had to give concessions to Japan, a former tribute 
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state.92 The traditional Sino-Japanese relations changed profoundly; Japan’s emergence 
as a military power in the region affected the image of Chinese superiority.93 The 
Japanese Army caused traumatic incidents in China; the Nanking massacres, crimes of 
the Japanese Army are the historical events left in the psyche of Chinese society.94 The 
20th century historical incidents between China and Japan shape their current relations. 
The exploitation of history, territorial disputes, economic relations, and the 
economic and military rise of China are at the core aspects of Sino-Japanese relations. 
The historical enmity and territorial disputes are the main challenges between these two 
countries. 
Past trauma caused by Japan’s Imperial Army and the use of history by both 
China and Japan still shape the relations between these two countries. Japan’s atrocities 
conducted in China before and during World War II is a source of resentment for the 
Chinese people against Japan. There are two explanations for this resentment: the effect 
of these crimes was so horrific that it arouses tensions even today, and the Chinese 
Communist Party emphasizes these historic and traumatic events as a way of building 
Chinese identity and the legitimacy of the party.95 China’s exploitation of the Japanese 
Army’s atrocities contributes to the erosion of security between these two countries. 
Yinan He states that “historically derived mutual antipathy and mistrust can worsen the 
security concerns generated by the high ambiguity in their current power balance and 
cause serious mutual threat perception.”96 The threat perception of China and Japan of 
each other could affect the stability of their relations, if not lead to a major military 
problem.  
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The dispute over the sovereignty of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is another source of 
tension between China and Japan. In 2010, Japan captured a Chinese fishing boat around 
the islands.97 China cut export of rare materials to Japan; stopped diplomatic, cultural, 
and tourist relations; and detained some Japanese citizens in China as a response to the 
Japanese government.98 China’s reaction was strong as China perceived she was being 
forced to accept that the islands belong to Japan; the white papers of both countries 
reflected their opposing views on the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.99 In 
2012, Japan’s government bought the islands from private owners, which exacerbated the 
situation between China and Japan.100 The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands raised the old 
tensions between the two countries.  
The territorial dispute between China and Japan has become an issue of identity 
and security. Ryoko Nakano contends that “faced with anti-Japanese demonstrations and 
Chinese official actions to claim the islands, many Japanese who were originally not 
particularly passionate about the defense of the territory now perceive China as a real 
threat and believe that China always uses history to claim the moral high ground against 
Japan.”101 Japan has used the dispute over the islands in domestic politics to increase 
military compatibility of Japan’s Self Defense Forces.102 China’s stance about territorial 
disputes causes friction in the region. Research conducted by Pew Research Center 
regarding how Asians view each other paints a picture that is not optimistic: “there is 
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widespread concern among publics in East, Southeast, and South Asia that these frictions 
could lead to military conflict.”103 
A rising China economically and militarily is the primary concern for Japan in 
Sino-Japanese relations. The military build-up of China in the region, the modernization 
of the People’s Liberation Army, and the aggressive actions in territorial disputes force 
Japan to be suspicious of China’s “peaceful rise.” Although there is a significant 
economic relationship between these two countries, their problems impede further 
cooperation. The use of memories of atrocities committed by the Japanese Army in China 
for constructing a Chinese identity and the territorial disputes are the main challenges 
between China and Japan.  
B. THE CHINA–SOUTH KOREA RELATIONSHIP 
China historically has tried to have a friendly bordering neighbor in the Korean 
peninsula.104 After World War II and the Korean War, the relationship between these 
two countries was not established because of lingering enmity from the Korean War. 
Relations between South Korea and China, though, changed as the Cold War ended. In 
1992, the two countries renewed their relations; after the normalization of China–South 
Korea relations, the economic and later political relations between these two countries 
improved over the years.105 Economic reasons were the principal driver for 
establishment of their relations.  
South Korea has an ambivalent perception of China; while she thinks of China as 
an important partner for the development South Korea’s economy and as an essential 
element for reunification of the two Koreas, South Korea also believes a rising China 
could be a source of instability in the region.106  
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South Korea expanded her economic, political, and social ties with China after the 
normalization.107 China is the first major trading partner of South Korea with a share of 
more than that of both the United States’ and Japan’s trade volume, which are South 
Korea’s second and third largest trade partners.108 The relationship between China and 
South has improved in the last years. During the tenure of both countries’ recent leaders, 
bilateral bonds improved, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)-China Free Trade 
Agreement was signed in 2015.109 South Korea responded positively to China’s “One 
Belt, One Road” initiative, and joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.110 Both 
countries benefit from their economic relations. China’s role for the long-term objective 
of South Korea, reunification of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the 
ROK, is the other side of their relationship. 
Economic benefits were the key factors in their relations; however, another factor 
for South Korea was the expected benefit of having strong relations with China to 
improve the bond with North Korea.111 South Korea is aware of the role of China in 
resolving Korean Peninsula problems.112 South Korea tries to improve her relations with 
China to get support for the reunification. 
Although South Korea perceives a rising China as less threatening than Japan 
does,113 China still is a threat for South Korea as she “rank[s] the issues of China’s 
continued rise, China’s military modernization, and South Korea’s increasing 
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dependency on China’s economic high on the list of potential security threats to South 
Korea in the mid- to long term.”114  
South Korea’s security alliance with the United States is a main concern for China 
in their relations. The deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-
ballistic missile system against North Korea’s potential missile attack is a contentious 
issue for South Korea, as China opposes the expansion of U.S. military posture in the 
region.115 The hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China is the main 
concern for South Korea.116 South Korean leaders try to interact with both powers 
“separately and cooperatively.”117 South Korea in her relations with China tries to 
manage the super powers’ rivalry. China is essential for the economy and the strategic 
plans of South Korea, and the alliance between the United States and South Korea is 
important for the security of the ROK. 
Relations between China and South Korea have improved over the decades, and 
the trajectory of their relations is improving positively despite the hegemonic rivalry of 
powers. 
C. THE SOUTH KOREA–JAPAN RELATIONSHIP 
History is the main challenge between South Korea and Japan. The Korean 
Peninsula was seized by and suffered under the hard rule of Japan between 1905 and 
1945.118 In the new world of the two rival super powers after World War II and the 
Korean War, both Japan and South Korea became strong allies of the United States. The 
diplomatic relations between these two countries started in 1967.119 Despite being a close 
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ally to the United States, both countries have challenges that emanate from historical 
legacies of the Japanese Army.  
South Korea and Japan share strategic interests in the region. As Kei Koga states 
“both [are] treaty allies with the United States and share common strategic interests 
regarding regional security, including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”120 
However, the historical problems pose a tense bilateral relationship.  
The issue of the forced sex slaves known as “comfort women” is the most 
sensitive problem between South Korea and Japan. The Japanese Army forced mostly 
Korean women to be sex slaves in comfort places for the troops during World War II.121 
Despite an agreement between the two countries in 2015 about resolving the “comfort 
women” issue with Tokyo’s contribution to the fund for the survivors, the lack of an 
apology or admission of legal responsibility by Japanese officials aroused criticism from 
the Korean population.122 The unresolved “comfort women” issue needs several 
generations to soften South Korea’s anguish and resentment.  
Another problem is the Japanese leaders’ visit to the Yasukini Shrine, a shrine 
dedicated to warriors, including the Japanese war criminals from World War II. The 
Japanese leaders’ visit to the shrine caused tremendous protests within both South Korean 
and Chinese societies.123 The Yasukini Shrine problem inhibits resolving problems 
between the two countries. 
South Korea and Japan are allies of the United States and have security 
cooperation agreements with the United States. However, the historical legacy of the 
Japanese Army is the main challenge between two countries. The “comfort women” issue 
and the high-level visit of Japanese officials to the Yasukini Shrine are a great source of 
tension between the two countries. 
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D. THE CHALLENGES  
The countries of East Asia witnessed tremendous changes in the 20th century; the 
realization of their inability to compete against the Western powers, and the rise of 
China’s former tribute country, Japan as an industrialized nation and the new colonizer of 
the region, the World Wars, and the Japanese Army atrocities in the region during World 
War II, and the Cold War have shaped the relations of China, South Korea, and Japan. 
The current bilateral relations of these countries are mainly affected by the 
Japanese Army’s atrocities and war crimes during the colonization of Korea and China in 
the beginning of 20th century. The distrust and resentment among these societies, and 
long-standing territorial disputes are challenges in bilateral relations of China, South 




East Asia is important for the rest of the world, because the level of economic 
interaction between the region and the world is high. The rising China phenomenon, the 
response of the United States to a rising China and the interaction of these two major 
powers in the area, as well as the relations among the principal actors of the region—the 
United States, China, Japan, and South Korea—will determine the stability of the region.  
Historical events have shaped economic and security relations in East Asia. The 
region faced dramatic changes during the 19th and 20th centuries. China realized the 
great kingdom’s weak competitive status in relation to the West at that time.124 Starting 
from the Opium War, China lost its sovereign position to the tribute states of Asia. Japan 
rose to become the super power of the region after realizing the importance of 
modernization and industrialization. Following in the path of developed Western powers, 
after industrialization Japan turned her massive Imperial Army to the other Asian 
countries for their resources.125 Military elites ruled Japan during World War II, and the 
Japanese Army caused many traumas in China and Korea that remain as contentious 
issues between these countries.  
The current bilateral relations of China, Japan, and South Korea are forged by 
Japan’s pre-World War II colonization of Korea and China and by war crimes of 
Japanese Army. The distrust and resentment among these societies, and long-standing 
territorial disputes are drivers of bilateral relations. 
The problems among China, South Korea, and Japan, especially territorial 
disputes could trigger a military conflict.126 Given the complicated situation, solving the 
problems among these countries is essential for the stability of the region. Understanding 
the prospect and effects of a rising China is crucial to implementing policies within the 
area.  
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There are two prevailing schools of thought regarding with the rise of China and 
the implications of China’s ascent in East Asia. Realists view the rise of China as a 
reason for conflict and power struggle in the region; a rising power inevitably leads to an 
environment of conflict, because the other regional states would perceive the rising 
power as a threat. On the other hand, liberals view that the rise of China would be 
peaceful; liberals are optimistic about the ascendance of China and the future of Asia 
because of China’s interdependence with the global economy. 
Realists are pessimistic about the rise of China. The offensive realist Mearsheimer 
and power transition theorist Organski are the leading scholars on the phenomenon of a 
rising China. Mearsheimer contends that China will inevitably threaten the United States, 
because China would ultimately seek to maximize her share of world power. States only 
feel secure when they are more powerful relative to their competitors.127 Current 
economic and military development will inhibit a peaceful rise of China, and conflict is 
inevitable. Organski’s power transition theory suggests that the conflict is inevitable 
between the dominant power and the rising power, when the gap of power narrows. He 
contemplated that China would become “the most powerful nation on earth” back in the 
1960s.128 A rising China eventually will become a challenge to international order as she 
narrows the power gap between the United States. 
Liberals are optimistic about the international system. They believe cooperation and 
economic interdependence could mitigate conflicts among the states. Cooperation is most 
likely when there is a minimum level of gain. Liberals also contend that strong economic 
and institutional interactions among states and other international actors will decrease the 
likelihood of conflicts.129 Interdependence eliminates the possibility of conflict and war. 
China’s economic development has been through high interconnectedness to the global 
economic system. 
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China’s interaction with the global economic order increases the level of 
economic interdependency between China and the rest of the world. The growing 
economic interdependency has transformed the relationship between China and the rest 
of the world in a constructive way. China has become an engine of growth and a catalyst 
for regional integration. China’s interconnectedness to the world would inhibit it from 
taking military action. China would most likely try to solve its problems with other 
regional countries in a more peaceful way. Creating opportunities for these countries to 
solve their problems is important for the stability of the region. 
Turkey is a developing economy. East Asia presents a good opportunity for 
Turkey to develop her economy and increase her global political influence. Turkey thinks 
of herself also as an Asian country. Historical events are the primary source of good 
relations between Turkey and the region. Turkey’s economic relations increased after the 
1980s during her search to grow economically. It was during this period that Turkey 
started to establish economic links with Japan, South Korea, and China. Later, the 
historically good relations and increased economic relations helped to start some military 
and defense relations with these countries. Maritime security cooperation with Japan, 
defense industry projects with South Korea, and failed defense procurement due to the 
challenge of compatibility with China are military interaction efforts of Turkey with these 
countries. 
Two essential aspects shape Turkey’s interest and relations in regard to Asia. 
First, the economic significance of the region compels Turkey to give importance to East 
Asia in her economic policies. Second, the Central Asian and Xingjian issues are primary 
aspects of Turkish foreign policy; Turkey has historical, ethnic, and emotional bonds with 
both regions’ people. China’s increasing economic dominance and political influence in 
Central Asia, and the situation of Xingjian Uyghurs in China force Turkey to be proactive 
in the region, especially in her relations with China. Turkey’s engagement in East Asia by 
using historical bilateral good relations with China, South Korea, and Japan could 
contribute to the stability of East Asia.  
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